

# NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

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Y 4. G 74/9: S. HRG. 104-519

Nuclear Non-Proliferation, S.Hrg. 1...

## HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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MARCH 14, 1995

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs



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# NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

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TUESDAY, MARCH 14, 1995

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. William V. Roth, Jr., Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Members Present: Senators Roth, Cochran, McCain, Glenn, Levin, and Dorgan.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ROTH

Chairman ROTH. The Committee will please be in order.

First of all, I want to thank all of you for joining us today. I believe we have assembled a particularly distinguished panel of experts to assist us in examining the fate of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Dr. James Schlesinger has served, of course, as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense, and as the Nation's first Secretary of Energy.

Ambassador Graham is Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament. He will head the U.S. delegation to the 1995 Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Previously he served for 11 years as General Counsel in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and in key positions in negotiations on virtually all the key arms control agreements of the past 15 years.

General Goodpaster is Co-Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States. In his distinguished career, he has served as Commander-in-Chief of the United States European Command and as Supreme Allied Commander/Europe.

Ambassador Adelman is Vice President of the Institute for Contemporary Studies. He served as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under President Reagan.

Gentlemen, in only 4 weeks, the parties to the NPT will gather in New York to decide the future of this critical agreement. The NPT is universally regarded as the single most important component of the international effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is the very foundation upon which the entire global nuclear non-proliferation regime was constructed.

When the five declared nuclear weapons states ratified the NPT, they pledged to end the nuclear arms race, to undertake measures

towards nuclear disarmament, and not in any way to assist non-nuclear weapons states in gaining nuclear weapons.

For their part, the non-nuclear parties to the treaty pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept a system of safeguards to verify their compliance. Thus in joining the NPT, these countries transformed the acquisition of nuclear weapons from an act of national pride to a violation of international law.

Those who negotiated the NPT never expected that the treaty alone would end the global non-proliferation threat. Yet I believe even they would be surprised by the successes it has produced toward that end. Today there remain only five declared nuclear weapons states, not the 20 to 30 many experts once projected. There are also only three so-called "threshold" states.

The NPT has provided the overarching structure to end the nuclear arms race. With the ratification of START I and the ongoing discussion of START II, the race now is to bring down the number of nuclear weapons as quickly, safely and securely as possible.

Another indication of today's success has been the steady increase of its membership. With more than 170 members—and I believe we are up to 173 now with the recent accession of Eritrea—the NPT has the widest adherence of any arms control agreement in history. When backed by strong non-proliferation policies and verification measures, including international safeguards, the NPT keeps countries from believing they need the bomb for their safety. Thus it advances the security of all the world's nations.

Unfortunately the NPT was established with a limited lifespan. March 5 marked the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT. The treaty provides that on the 25th year, a conference of the parties will be convened to decide whether NPT will remain in force indefinitely for a fixed period of time or for a series of fixed periods.

The treaty further provides that the decision on extension will be made by the majority of parties to the treaty, and the result will be legally binding for all parties, whatever vote they cast.

I believe the indefinite, the non-conditional, extension is essential. The NPT must be made permanent if we are to contain the terrible threat posed to all nations by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Anything short of indefinite extension would deal a major blow the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, because at the end of any specified extension period, the treaty could be undermined, and the global norm prohibiting the further acquisition of nuclear weapons would thus be destroyed.

We must never allow such an outcome, because it will jeopardize the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime, so painstakingly crafted over the past quarter-century. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the decisions we make today about global security, will dramatically affect the lives of generations to come. No decision is more important than the one the world faces next month on the future of the NPT.

Despite the critical need for making the NPT permanent, a number of countries are actively opposing indefinite extension. Some say that indefinite extension should be made contingent on the ratification of a comprehensive test ban treaty or an agreement to cap the amount of material available for nuclear explosives. Others



seek universal membership in the NPT or a timetable for complete nuclear disarmament.

By holding the NPT's future hostage to such goals, these countries undermine the likelihood of the treaty's indefinite extension. What they do not seem to realize, ironically, is that in doing so they also jeopardize the very framework critical to the achievement of their own goals.

Indefinite extension of the NPT does not preclude adjustment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime; in fact, it would make permanent the climate of trust conducive to more restrictive controls over weapons-grade nuclear materials and related technologies and activities.

Given the narrow focus of the NPT conference next month, the only question treaty parties should ask is whether the world is a safer place with the treaty in force.

I believe that the answer to that question is unambiguously yes. I further believe that any country opposing indefinite unconditional extension of the treaty is acting against not only its interests, but also against the interests of the United States and indeed of the people of the entire world, because the nuclear non-proliferation regime and global security will be placed at risk.

Now I would like to turn to my distinguished colleague, who is a well-recognized expert in this area and has taken a great interest.

Senator Glenn?

#### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GLENN

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

We have done a lot of work in this area mutually through the years. I just gave each one of our guests this morning a copy of this Nuclear Proliferation Fact Book that the Committee had published last December, and I would commend it to your reading.

It deals with the history of the non-proliferation efforts, the basic technology of bombs, regional problems, legislation, treaties, regulation, other vital data.

We tried, through the Congressional Research Service, to get as much material together in one spot, because you need references all the time, on all these issues. We tried to make this sort of a complete fact book.

I see Zack Davis back here. Zack, I think, did a lot of work on this over at CRS. Stand up, because you people did a lot of effort in this area.

[Applause.]

There are a lot of other people involved over there, too. I do not mean to—Zack Davis, Carl Behrens, and the former CRS Senior Specialist, Warren Donnelly, who is retired, but who helped this Committee for, I do not know what, 15 years, I guess, on matters nuclear, and has frequently appeared before our Committee, and so we wanted to give him credit also.

I think this was a big work, and I think it will be quite handy. We do not have enough copies to pass out to all the press, but if you want to get it, we can refer you over to CRS where you can get a copy of it.

I think it is great that Senator Roth is having this hearing this morning. I appreciate it very much. He has had a long interest in this area, as have I.

We have shared a commitment to the NPT, and I am very pleased that prospects are brightening for the treaty, although there are still a few bridges to cross in the next few weeks.

Congress is fully behind—I believe Congress is fully behind the President's efforts to make the NPT a permanent fixture of the global non-proliferation regime.

Next month, representatives of the 173 members of the NPT will gather in New York to determine how long the treaty will remain in force. It will be praised by many observers in the weeks ahead. It will also be the target of some pointed criticisms, and not all of them unwarranted.

For example, the NPT has come under attack over the years for having failed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly in the case of some NPT parties—Iran, Iraq, North Korea. This is perhaps the easiest criticism to dismiss, since NPT was never intended as a quick-fix, to do everything there is to do with non-proliferation globally.

But other critics say the NPT puts too much emphasis on promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy, and at the same time, not enough on safeguards.

There is some undeniable tension between the promotional and the regulatory goals of the NPT, especially when pressures grow for increased commercial uses of bomb-usable nuclear materials.

But membership in the treaty accords certain rights and duties. The NPT is first and foremost a non-proliferation, not a trade promotion, treaty.

Other criticisms, particularly coming from certain developing countries, have alleged that the NPT focuses too much on non-proliferation and not enough on promoting both nuclear disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Anti-NPT propagandists have condemned the treaty's alleged system to "atomic apartheid" and its hidden purpose of "disarming the unarmed." Yet the evidence tells a different story.

First, the United States and Russia and have made significant progress, indeed, in implementing their NPT arms control commitments, and second, by my reading, the export licensing data of the U.S. for nuclear and dual-use goods suggests, if anything, a system driven more by rubber-stamp approvals and by discriminatory denials.

Let me just say that we are encouraging nations to get into the NPT. Years ago, what we used to hear was: Well, when you and the Soviet Union, when you get your weapons stockpiles down, then we will consider getting into something like this. And we kept saying: Well, let us, for heaven's sake, not expand them more, and we are trying not to do that.

Well, progress is occurring in our time. We and the Russians now are really getting our stockpiles down. And so that makes the extension of NPT even more appropriate at this particular time, as I see it.

Other critics have found fault with the treaty's easy exist clause, which permits a state to leave the treaty on 90 days notice. And

that is short notice. We have never had anybody jump ship or seriously get into the jumping ship mode, except North Korea. That crisis seems to have abated, at least for the moment, a little bit. And so nobody has really exercised that 90-day exit in the history of the NPT.

The treaty does not define certain key terms adequately like “nuclear explosive device” and “manufacture.” There needs to be better definitions of some of these terms.

Nor does the treaty adequately prohibit exports of sensitive nuclear-weapons-related technology.

And rather than rebut all of the allegations made by the treaty’s critics or recount all of the many arguments used on behalf of the treaty by its proponents, I believe that the NPT should be extended definitely because: First, the world community needs a basic framework to guide the global effort to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons.

Given its near-universal support in the world community, the NPT helps to delegitimize the further proliferation and ultimately the possession and use of nuclear weapons.

Second, the NPT serves as foundation for a strong national non-proliferation policy. Nuclear weapons states, for example, have committed themselves “not in any way” to assist the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Each state has promulgated domestic laws and regulations to enforce this commitment. At a time when each of these countries, especially our own, is under great pressure to relax export controls in the name of quick profits, the NPT offers essential guidance of what is permissible by way of trade control reform.

Third, the NPT is a fair deal. It involves reciprocal duties on the part of the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states. The former must not assist other countries to get the bomb and must negotiate in good faith to curb the nuclear arms race, pursue nuclear disarmament, and work toward a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The latter must not acquire the bomb, must agree to safeguards over the full scope of their activities involving nuclear materials and must also pursue global disarmament objectives.

These are different types of obligations. It is not correct to condemn the treaty as simply discriminatory. Besides, if it were so discriminatory, why would 173 countries be entered as parties to the NPT?

So regardless of what happens to the NPT, we will still have to live with a global nuclear weapons proliferation threat for many years. I think if we did not have an NPT, we would have to invent one. So why not continue it on for the indefinite future?

I would prefer to address that threat, however, having a permanent NPT and strong national policies in our diplomatic tool kit rather than not having them.

This is but one part of a bigger problem. We are concerned more and more every day about weapons of mass destruction going beyond the nuclear. I think that one of these days chemical weapons, in their ease of proliferation, which are very simple compared to anything required for nuclear weapons, that the chemical weapons may become the “poor man’s nukes,” in effect. Almost any nation

can develop a credible chemical weapons capability, quite sophisticated.

Judge Webster, when he was still the head of the CIA, testified sitting at where, I believe, Jim Schlesinger is right here this morning at this table, and testified that a very credible weapons factory could be in a room, a space about the size of this hearing room. And that shows how easy it is and how tough it is to find out where all the chemical weapons—related items are going on all over the world, the terrorist groups or nations or whatever.

So I think that in addition to the NPT, which is our focus this morning, of course, I think we also need, along with the chemical weapons treaties and the other things going on with biological weapons also, we need also to concentrate on those areas too and maybe make some cooperative ways of doing this through the—I do not know whether there is any way at all where we could use the NPT as a basis for expanding our efforts in some of these other areas with chemical weapons and biological, and I think that is one area that we probably should look into in the future.

But that remains for another day. That is not the subject of our hearing this morning.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROTH. Thank you, Senator. Senator McCain?

#### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a brief statement, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding this hearing.

I understand that in preparation for next month's review conference there has been considerable progress in gaining the support required for the permanent extension of the NPT. I am encouraged by those reports, and I want to make clear that although I have disagreed with the administration on its handling of specific proliferation threats in North Korea and Iran, I support the extension of the treaty.

Once the votes are secured for extension, however, I would encourage the administration to take a hard look at the way in which the treaty is implemented.

In recent years, it has been signatories to the treaty—Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—who have posed the most dangerous post-Cold War nuclear threats. This fact alone obviously warrants a review of the NPT inspection and enforcement procedures.

I greatly felt that instead of building on what the precedent set forcefully uncovering the Iraqi nuclear program, in Korea we acted in a manner that called into question our resolve. There should be no doubt that Iran and other nations have taken note of North Korean contempt for its obligation under the NPT. It would be reasonable for the regime in Iran to assume, as I would assume, if I were an Iranian policymaker, that flouting the NPT or conditioning its compliance can only be a net gain.

The administration should make clear that notwithstanding its approach to North Korea, signatories to the NPT will be held accountable. Signatories will not be permitted to violate the treaty, delay inspections, provoke a crisis, and expect to be rewarded, as they were with North Korea.



The long-term viability of the NPT will be determined not by the number of signatures successive Presidents may secure, but by its strict enforcement.

For the sake of stemming perhaps the greatest threat to our national security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we must extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

But equally important to our security, we must implement it purposefully and consistently, so as not to diminish its impact.

I understand that the administration is making an all-out push for votes for permanent extension of the treaty. Among the holdouts, there are a few that are really no surprise. I did not expect to see Iran leading the charge for a safer world. But I am disappointed to see that among the holdouts are Mexico and Europe [sic].

Mexico must understand that the day of them being able to carry out an anti-American foreign policy and expect support and assistance from the United States is over.

Our friends in Egypt must understand that as the second largest beneficiary of United States foreign aid, that we would expect a far more cooperative attitude in spirit.

I hope that will be made clear as we conduct our efforts to gain a large majority of signatories to this treaty.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this hearing and your long-term involvement and commitment to this issue.

Chairman ROTH. I thank the distinguished Senator for his statement. I assume when he said "Mexico and Europe," he meant "Egypt."

Senator MCCAIN. Excuse me. I meant—I am sorry, old age—I meant Egypt was the second largest beneficiary. I apologize.

Chairman ROTH. I share that same concern and appreciate your bringing it up.

Well, it is a pleasure to have Secretary Schlesinger here. We will begin with you.

#### **TESTIMONY OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND FORMER SECRETARY OF ENERGY**

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Glenn, Senator McCain.

I am delighted to appear before this Committee this morning as the United States and other nations prepare for the NPT Renewal and Extension Conference next month and as this Committee fulfills its oversight role regarding American policy.

For almost 50 years, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy. Thanks to Senator Glenn's compendium, you can go back to the Baruch Plan of 1946, the first item in the book.

For almost 30 years, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been a cornerstone of that policy. Negotiated during the Johnson Administration, it was put into force by President Nixon. It has long and deservedly enjoyed bipartisan support.

The problems associated with the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly should they fall into irresponsible hands, have been so

obvious that this position of the U.S. Government, perhaps unsurprisingly, has generated little internal controversy.

All this points to why, after 25 years, all responsible parties should seek the indefinite extension of the treaty, and it calls for the most vigorous effort by the U.S. Government to achieve that goal.

As important as the goal of non-proliferation has been over these decades, Mr. Chairman, the end of the Cold War has, if anything, increased its importance. Clearly this is true in a relative sense as the anxiety about a major nuclear exchange between East and West has faded.

But other elements add considerable weight to this greater emphasis.

First, though the world is far less dangerous, especially from an American standpoint, it has been marked by a notable instability as the Cold War disciplines have weakened. National, religious, and other animosities have grown more prominent, or perhaps one should say even more prominent. Adding nuclear weapons to this explosive mix clearly would be undesirable.

Second, the breakup of the Soviet Union immediately added to the number of nuclear weapons states, as well as to the danger of what has been termed "loose nukes." The decline of internal control, the rise of extended external trade, and the growth of crime have resulted in the fear of criminal commerce in weapons-grade materials. And at last and at least in some quarters, the eagerness to acquire nuclear weapons has increased. Thus the end of the Cold War, with all its consequences, justifies, indeed demands, a greater focus on preventing proliferation.

The Clinton Administration has, from the first, identified the goal of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons as a principal objective of its foreign policy. It early focused on the consequences of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the steps it has taken in this respect have been impressive.

It has also sought to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons elsewhere.

I am happy to see that it is now focusing attention at the highest levels of Government on the indefinite extension of the NPT. That objective deserves to have behind it the full weight of the U.S. Government. And there should be no doubt left in the minds of any other Governments that failure to support extension would earn the substantial displeasure of the U.S. Government with all that that implies in future transactions.

Mr. Chairman, I have now endorsed fully the rightness of American policy and the need to place our full strength behind that policy. I should like, therefore, to add a few observations, primarily of a cautionary nature.

First, while preventing further nuclear spread is important for the United States, it is even more important for others, particularly those in less stable regions of the world. It is in such regions that nuclear weapons would most likely be used, were they to spread.

Thus the important of non-proliferation is perhaps most notable in what for so long has been called The Third World. It is therefore the height of irony that much of the resistance to the indefinite extension of the NPT is centered within the non-aligned movement.

I do not here refer to the Irans or Libyas of this world, which believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would help them pursue what they regard as their own interests. Even such states may find, however, that achieving their desires will prove to be a curse rather than a blessing.

I refer rather to those nations that are friendly to the United States and have every reason to support its policy of non-proliferation. Some of these states are tempted to continue the diplomatic games of the Cold War through which they earlier attempted to extract concessions or another in exchange for their votes or support. It is important to underscore to all parties that that day is over. We should not make undue accommodation or unreasonable concessions to persuade others to do what is more in their own interests than in ours.

Second, it is essential to protect the U.S. nuclear deterrent. I cannot overstate the importance of such measures, for some lose sight of this essential element in the desire to assuage the desires of others.

There is a good deal of talk about eliminating the discrimination between weapons states and non-weapons states, ultimately eliminating nuclear stockpiles, further reducing such weapons at this time, etc.

It is important to be clear that the distinction between weapons states and non-weapon states is not going to be eliminated. Nuclear weapons, moreover, will be with us for the indefinite future.

Some of the non-aligned states would have us pretend that these simple realities do not exist. They demand that the United States make commitments, purely abstract commitments, regarding non-discrimination, elimination of nuclear weapons and so on.

It is necessary to put to such nations the question of whether it is really in their interest for the United States precipitously to weaken its own deterrent. To me, much of this discussion is reminiscent of the early reaction of some of her neighbors to the rearmament of Germany. On the one hand, they wanted a rearmed Germany to be strong enough to deter the Soviet Union; on the other, not so strong as to threaten Luxembourg.

It is in the interest of all of the nations that desire stability for the United States to continue to have a deterrent sufficiently impressive to deter weapons use by other states. The game of flagellating the United States in disarmament conferences is one to which many diplomats from The Third World became habituated during the Cold War. I look forward to Ambassador Graham's comments on this.

It is time to end that game. It is also time to curb the tendency to satisfy those demands by rummaging through our nuclear deterrent to see what we can throw overboard without doing too much damage.

Third, it is essential to bear in mind that no agreement is self-enforcing. Of importance at least equal to the treaty itself is verification. Extension of the treaty is a necessary, but from a sufficient condition for preventing proliferation.

Adequate verification that others are living up to their commitments is an indispensable corollary of the treaty itself. If others are not persuaded that they will be caught, they will be tempted to vio-

late the treaty. Our experience with both Iraq and North Korea should make this point sufficiently clear that it requires no further discussion.

What should also be clear is the necessity not only for continuing vigilance on our own part, but for consistent support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which bears the primary international responsibility for monitoring the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Arms control agreements do not tend to themselves. And alert and vigorous enforcement is also essential.

Let me follow up Senator McCain's comments that enforcement is much more than detection. The IAEA has a responsibility for detection, but enforcement rests outside of the IAEA, either with the individual states or with the Security Council of the United Nations.

In the absence of such a vigorous effort, a treaty, by itself, could turn out to be harmful in that it lulls us all into a sense of security that may turn out to be false.

Mr. Chairman, with these few cautionary observations concluded, I want to reiterate the high priority that should be assigned to this nation's non-proliferation policy and to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

As you indicated in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, over the decades there has been steady pessimism on the part of many so-called experts regarding the prospect for restraining the spread of nuclear weapons. Those early prognostications have turned out to be excessively gloomy. If we are both alert and vigorous, we may be able to continue to defer the substantial spread of nuclear weapons and the wider availability of such weapons into the indefinite future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROTH. Thank you, Secretary Schlesinger.

We will wait until we complete the presentation of the panel for questions.

Ambassador Graham, you are the man on the firing line. We are looking forward to your testimony.

#### **TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS GRAHAM, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT FOR ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT**

Ambassador GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Glenn, and Senator McCain. I would like to submit my statement for the record and make some less formal comments.

Chairman ROTH. Your full statement will be included as if read.

Ambassador GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And we do appreciate the Committee holding this hearing. It is a very important decision that faces the world community at the Review and Extension Conference to be held in New York next April and May, and the decision that is made on the NPT will be one that will undoubtedly affect the security of the United States and the security of the world community for many years to come.

The NPT is the most widely adhered to of all arms control treaties. It currently has 173 parties. This number is likely to rise to 175 very soon. We understand that Palau, one of the Pacific Island



states, and Chile are likely to join very soon. They have both submitted the request to join through their legislatures.

And there is very wide support around the world for the NPT regime and for its continuance and for its strengthening and, indeed in my judgment, for making this treaty, as it should be, a permanent part of the international security system.

Senator McCain, we agree completely on your comments on enforcement and compliance. Undoubtedly this will be a significant issue under discussion at the conference. Efforts are underway now to strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect violations and to better monitor the treaty. We have the ongoing 93-plus-2 program, so-called because it began in 1993 and is to last for 2 years, and the first report on that program will be made at the end of this month in Vienna, and it will include new technologies such as environmental sampling as a way of better monitoring the treaty provisions.

And as I said, there is wide support for the treaty, but there certainly—as Secretary Schlesinger has indicated, there has certainly been some opposition, some debate within the international community. We think the trend is in the right direction, but certainly this is not going to be an easy conference; in fact, it is going to be a very difficult one. And we will achieve the desired result at the end, but it is not going to come easy, and we very much appreciate the support of the Senate and the Congress. It greatly strengthens our position, and I really mean that.

As has been indicated, the NPT is indeed the cornerstone of the non-proliferation—international non-proliferation regime and of the various arms control regimes that exist and, indeed, to a large degree of peace and stability in the world.

Yet of all these regimes, of all these international arrangements to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to limit arms and armaments, all of which are based on the NPT, this what might be called the grandfather agreement is the only one whose future is in doubt. It is the only one with an uncertain future. All the others have a permanent duration. The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the emerging African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, START I, START II—all of these are permanent agreements. Only the NPT has a cloud over its future, and that cloud must be eliminated. This treaty must be made a permanent part of the international security system.

And we should also keep in mind in considering this issue that the NPT Review and Extension Conference, which starts next month, is perhaps our only opportunity that we will ever have to make this treaty permanent.

According to the treaty, Article X.2, it is provided that a majority of the parties will meet 25 years after entry into force to decide whether the treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for a fixed period or periods. That decision is built into the treaty. That decision can be made at the conference. It does not have to be referred to national legislatures, of which there are now 173 which would be involved.

When a country, when a state, joins the NPT, it buys into this. It accepts this procedure whereby this decision, this important security, legal decision can be made at the conference, and it is im-

mediately effective, immediately legally binding on all states, no matter how they vote, without reference to national legislatures, and that decision can be made by majority vote, unlike the consensus rule that is so often applicable in international multilateral arms control negotiations.

And that provision is not there by accident. When the treaty was being negotiated in the late 1960s, it was negotiated under the consensus rule in Geneva by some 18 countries, members of the Conference on Disarmament. Most countries in that negotiation wanted to make NPT permanent like all the other arms control agreements, but a small number of countries, two or three countries, were unwilling to permanently give up the nuclear option, so consensus could not be achieved.

This was the height of the Cold War; it was not clear who was going to join the treaty and who was not, and also it was uncertain what the commercial effects of the safeguards system would be, so consensus could not be reached.

So the compromise was: All right, 25 years, and then the parties will decide not by consensus, but by majority vote, whether or not then to make the treaty permanent. That was what the negotiators did, and I think, we think, that they should try to carry out their spirit and try to get a majority vote for indefinite extension hopefully with the largest majority that we can.

The President has made it very clear that the United States strongly favors indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, and he has stressed most recently in his address to the Nixon Center on March 1 that indefinite extension of the NPT is of the highest foreign policy priority for the United States. And we favor indefinite extension for three reasons.

The NPT is the principal means of reinforcing the norm of nuclear non-proliferation. The NPT is the principal foundation for the regime for international cooperation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the NPT promotes further advances in international arms control.

Ever since the NPT entered into force, the move to become a nuclear weapons state has no longer been a legitimate one. Going nuclear is not an accepted norm, and we can thank the NPT for that.

Prior to 1970 when the NPT entered into force, the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal was seen as something—as an act of national pride. The NPT made it a violation of international law.

Now with 173 parties, soon to be 175, this norm is firmly established globally. The vitality of the norm of non-proliferation has been instrumental in the way the international community has responded to the challenges of Iraq and North Korea, and it will be the basis of any future challenges to the regime.

Anything less than indefinite extension would create doubts about the resolve of the international community. Anything less than indefinite extension could encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Anything less than indefinite could significantly reduce the prospects for further arms control progress.

Anything less than indefinite extension could seriously weaken the international system of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

Anything less than indefinite extension would discourage efforts to achieve universality of membership in the NPT.

Anything less than indefinite extension will not do.

The vitality of the norm affects even those states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel that have not yet joined the treaty. The world judges them, to an extent, by the norm established by the NPT, even though they may not be bound by the specific provisions of the treaty.

Nuclear energy has the capacity to benefit humankind from radiation treatments for cancer to improvement of the quality and reliability of agricultural and manufactured products. But the world must be assured that nuclear material and technology will not be diverted to build nuclear explosive devices.

This is where the NPT comes in. The NPT requires that all non-nuclear weapons states conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA within 18 months of becoming a party to the treaty. The duration of these IAEA safeguards agreements is directly linked to that of the NPT. Were the duration of the NPT to be in doubt, so would the duration of the safeguards agreements. In that case, the reliability of the regime for international cooperation peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be shaken.

Just to give an example, it takes 10 years to build a power reactor, and it is operated for 30 years, and then the spent fuel has to be safeguarded after that. If an uncertain NPT regime exists and therefore an uncertain safeguards regime which is required for that project, such projects will be more difficult to commence.

Sometimes we hear arguments that the NPT should not be extended indefinitely because this would put more pressure on the nuclear weapons states to negotiate arms control agreements.

The fact is, as I said, however, anything less than indefinite extension would make arms control much more difficult. We negotiate arms control agreements because it is in our national security interest to do so, not because we are being pressured by other states.

Under Article VI of the treaty, we are obligated to undertake negotiations in good faith to end the arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament, and we are, therefore, accountable to the other NPT parties for undertaking these negotiations.

But the principal impact of the NPT is that it institutionalizes the commitment of states not to acquire nuclear weapons, so that states making a significant commitment to reduce nuclear weapons are assured that they are now doing so in an environment of non-proliferation. Without this assurance, arms control would become very difficult.

Moreover, we believe that we have a strong effort of arms control accomplishments. The INF treaty of 1988 eliminated an entire category of nuclear delivery systems. START entered into force last December. START I will reduce nuclear weapons by that—strategic nuclear weapons by about 40 percent. START II, now before the Senate, will reduce nuclear warheads even further, to no more than 3,500 warheads each for the United States and Russia.

Sixty percent of the nuclear stockpile that existed at the peak of the Cold War has already been eliminated; 90 percent of the tactical nuclear weapons. By the time START II is fully implemented, that figure will rise for the overall stockpile to 80 percent.

Our job is not yet done. As you know, President Clinton has emphasized the importance of achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty at the earliest possible date. We hope to press ahead soon on negotiations for a cutoff of the future production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

To maintain this momentum, it is crucial that the durability of the NPT never be in question; in other words, that it be extended indefinitely.

I am cautiously optimistic that we will achieve indefinite extension of the NPT. Many states and organizations of states—NATO, the European Union, OSCE, the South Pacific Forum, the Central American States, and others—have publicly declared their support for indefinite extension.

Giving the NPT permanence will mark a beginning, not an end, to our efforts. The way the world views nuclear weapons for decades to come will largely be shaped by what takes place in New York this spring. The Review and Extension Conference is an historic opportunity for the world to speak out and take action against the threat of nuclear weapons.

We are happy to have the support of the Congress; we need the support of the Congress in making the political and legal barriers against nuclear non-proliferation as strong as they can possibly be, beginning with the indefinite extension of the NPT.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Graham follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS GRAHAM, JR.

I would like to thank Chairman Roth and the Committee for inviting me to address you this morning and for the ongoing interest of the Chairman in the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT. I would also like to thank Senator Glenn for his continued activism on behalf of nuclear nonproliferation.

I will begin my testimony by clarifying my view of what nonproliferation means, what the NPT has accomplished during its first 25 years, and why the administration is so committed to making this treaty permanent. The United States detonated the first atomic explosion in 1945. In the first 25 years of the nuclear age, between 1945 and 1970, four other nations declared their own nuclear arsenals. In the second 25 years, from 1970, when the NPT entered into force, until today, not a single state has openly declared the acquisition of nuclear weapons. A small but decreasing number of "threshold states" has muddied the waters, but, there was a marked change in global attitudes toward nuclear proliferation in 1970. Twenty-five years ago last Sunday, the acquisition of nuclear weapons stopped being a point of national pride, instead the NPT made it a violation of international law.

Some question the usefulness of international law. I would ask them to consider that when the NPT was negotiated in the 1960s, estimates suggested there would be over thirty nuclear weapons states by 1980, and who knows how many by now, if this dangerous trend had been left unchecked. These estimates proved wrong, despite increasing diffusion of technology and know-how. If the technology is so unstoppable, why then do not more countries have the bomb? Because countries around the world have taken the political decision that they are more secure without nuclear weapons than with them. This view is underscored by the emergence of nuclear weapon free zones: first, the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, the Treaty of Tlatelolco signed in 1967 and strengthened recently through the full adherence of Argentina and Brazil; the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, or the Treaty of Raratonga was signed in 1986; and the emerging African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty is expected to be signed in June of this year. It should be noted that all of these Treaties are of permanent duration, as the NPT should be. But beyond this, the NPT is the strongest single bulwark supporting ongoing political decisions against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is the only Treaty prohibiting nuclear proliferation on a world-wide basis and is the cornerstone on



which the others were built. The United States built atomic weapons in the 1940s in the context of World War II; 50 years later, the best way to keep other states from becoming nuclear proliferators is to convince them that they do not want nuclear weapons. And the NPT does just that. The number of states that seriously consider the nuclear option is diminishing. Recent years have seen Argentina, Ukraine, and South Africa all join the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties. Brazil did the same by bringing into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The NPT encourages states to act in their own self-interest by not building nuclear weapons, which might encourage their neighbors to do the same. It is a common sense agreement; this is not a weakness, but rather the core of its enduring value. It forms the security environment in which states can be sure that their neighbors are not building nuclear weapons and that nuclear weapons are not the only currency of power. It serves as a foundation upon which we have been able to build remarkable arms control progress in recent years with the former Soviet Union. It affirmatively commits nearly 175 of the 185 members of the United Nations in opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, isolating hold-outs and subjecting them to international standards of a Treaty to which they are not even parties. It establishes a global norm against nuclear proliferation. I do not need to say that the world would be different without the NPT; the world was different without the NPT. Given the progress we have made in recent years in controlling and reducing weapons of mass destruction, our belief in a better, safer future should be stronger. Most of all, we need to jealously protect the conditions that make progress possible. The NPT is central among these conditions; it should be permanent, like all other arms control agreements now in force.

In his State of the Union Address in January, President Clinton declared that the United States is "leading the charge" for the indefinite extension of the NPT. The President's imagery is very appropriate. Although nothing can be certain before the final vote, and we must continue to work hard to realize our goal of a permanent international bulwark against nuclear proliferation, a great many nations have already declared their support for indefinite extension of the NPT, already over seventy-five states have publicly committed to a permanent NPT, either singly or as part of a group. The "charge" is strong and growing.

This did not happen by accident. United States actions in recent years have set the stage, by cutting our own nuclear arsenals and persuading more and more governments to join the NPT. President Clinton's decision to embrace a moratorium on nuclear tests and press for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to call for a global convention to ban production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes, and his efforts to bring Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan into the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties and to bring North Korea back into compliance with its NPT obligations, all contributed to our efforts to extend the NPT, in addition President Clinton and other senior administration officials have raised this issue repeatedly with other world leaders. I have personally visited the capitals of over thirty countries in the past year to stress to their leadership the importance of indefinite extension to the United States, and to their own national, regional, and global security interests. We have approached foreign officials on this issue in innumerable multilateral fora and have raised it bilaterally with virtually every country in the world. In my 25-year career in arms control for the U.S. Government, I have never seen an administration more unanimously and fully committed to any other effort than the Clinton Administration is to the achievement of indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. President Clinton has told us that he wants a permanent NPT. He has asked Vice President Gore to lead the United States delegation to the Review and Extension Conference this Spring to see that it happens. But more than this, every Department and Agency involved brings its own share of commitment to the effort. And also it should be recognized that nonproliferation has always had bipartisan support representing great commitment in both the Executive Branch and the Congress.

Symbolizing this bipartisan commitment, the President reiterated his personal support for a permanent NPT 2 weeks ago at a policy conference at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, saying "nothing is more important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons than extending the Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally. . . ." He reaffirmed the commitment of the U.S. Government to the central goals of the treaty: nonproliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and the pursuit of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The President went further, demonstrating the United States commitment to the goals of the Treaty by ordering 200 tons of fissile material—enough for thousands of nuclear weapons—to be permanently withdrawn from the United States nuclear stockpile. None of that material will be used to build a nuclear weapon ever again. The President decided that this bold disarmament gesture was an appropriate way

to emphasize the commitment of the United States to Article VI and to the Treaty more generally. We expect his commitment to a safer world to be matched by a majority of the states parties to the NPT in May.

It is in this climate of strong commitment and single-minded purpose within the Executive Branch that I heartily welcome the involvement of the Legislative Branch in our effort to make the NPT permanent, and ask for Congressional support to promote indefinite extension. I cannot overstate how much my own efforts are strengthened by knowing and being able to state to other foreign representatives that the United States Congress supports the indefinite extension of the NPT.

The Review and Extension Conference will begin in New York in 5 weeks where our commitment and extensive preparations will be put to the test. We have rallied the largest plurality of states parties behind the indefinite extension option; and only a small minority have declared their opposition.

Some undecided states parties have approached us suggesting that we should consider a compromise solution on the duration of the extension. Although most of them favor indefinite extension in principle, they assume that by finding a compromise between the "extreme" positions the states parties may be more likely to be able to reach consensus on the extension decision. The premise on which this assumption rests is flawed. Indefinite extension is not an extreme option. It is not designed to balance another proposal, it is offered in good faith as the best alternative.

More questionable still is the unstated assumption that the proposal rests upon, that the two "extreme" positions are equivalent, or even comparable. The United States favors indefinite extension to continue to strive for a better, safer world until that world arrives, no matter how long it takes. Our goal is the central goal of the Treaty: a permanent barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. States that favor short extensions are not supporting this central goal of the Treaty. Their position would have the effect of reopening the nuclear weapons option for many countries; their position would weaken the law, the international norm against nuclear weapon proliferation.

Consensus is desirable, but not necessary to make the Treaty strong and permanent. Article X of the Treaty specifically envisions the extension decision being taken by a majority of the parties. This is no accident. This aspect of Article X was carefully crafted in recognition that the extension decision at the end of 25 years was fundamentally too important to risk it being held hostage to a consensus decision requirement. If consensus were the rule this Spring, one state could block a successful extension outcome; the wishes of the vast majority would go unrealized because one state—or a handful of states—was unwilling to accept a particular extension decision. This would be unacceptable.

Anything less than indefinite extension would create doubts about the resolve of the international community vis a vis the nonproliferation norm. Anything less than indefinite extension could encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Anything less than indefinite extension could significantly reduce the prospects for arms control progress. Anything less than indefinite extension could seriously weaken the international system of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Anything less than indefinite extension would discourage efforts to achieve universality of membership in the NPT. Anything less than indefinite extension will not do.

The NPT is not a lever, at least not in the sense that it can be used to lever disarmament concessions out of the nuclear weapons states against their national security interests. We entered into the Treaty because its provisions, including the Article VI provisions which commit us to pursue the ultimate goal of global nuclear disarmament, are in our national security interest. We continue to comply with our obligations under the Treaty, including our Article VI obligations, because it continues to be in our national security interest to do so. The mechanism by which the Treaty promotes arms control among the nuclear weapon states is that it promotes confidence that the rest of the world will never acquire nuclear weapons. If the NPT is used to promote uncertainty and erode confidence, then it cannot promote disarmament.

The United States is doing all that is within its political and technical ability to carry out its Article VI obligations. The nuclear arms race is over. In recent years the United States and the former Soviet Union have: destroyed over 2,500 intermediate-range missiles, thus eliminating an entire class of weapons systems; decided unilaterally to withdraw and dismantle thousands more tactical arms; and agreed in the START I and START II Treaties reduce their strategic nuclear forces by more than two-thirds from pre-START levels. The United States and the former Soviet Union are engaged in nuclear disarmament in as ambitious a time-bound framework as technical limitations will permit; the United States alone is dismantling its arsenal at the rate of up to 2,000 nuclear weapons a year. By the year 2003, 79 percent of the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile will have been eliminated, including

71 percent of strategic weapons and 90 percent of nonstrategic nuclear forces. Fifty-nine percent of the stockpile has already been eliminated. Through the leadership of Senators Nunn and Lugar, we are aiding Russia in its effort to safely and securely dismantle the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. Just to implement reductions already agreed to, we will need to continue this rapid dismantlement into the next century. But this and any future progress depends on a strong and durable nuclear nonproliferation regime. The NPT is the bedrock upon which that regime is built. The NPT embodies the only legally binding commitment on the nuclear weapons states to negotiate towards a nuclear free world; it provides the only existing context in which such negotiations could even be contemplated. A vote against permanence for the NPT is a vote against disarmament; it is inescapably a vote for more, not fewer, nuclear weapons.

The United States strongly promotes universal adherence to the NPT. A strong permanent NPT is in our national security interest, and we believe that it is at least as much in the national security interests of every other country in the world. It is true that a few states with active nuclear programs remain outside the Treaty. But the Treaty works for us. It directs international pressure against states outside the regime. Without the NPT, it would be difficult to even define nuclear proliferation as undesirable behavior among nations. The best way to promote universal adherence to the NPT, to pull the last 7 percent of the membership of the United Nations into the Treaty, is to make the Treaty permanent. Once they fully understand that the rule of international law against nuclear proliferation is not going away someday, the pressure to join the Treaty will grow ever more compelling. Indefinite extension promotes the long-standing United States goal of universal adherence to the NPT.

Indefinite extension will constitute global recognition that the Cold War is over, and that Cold War thinking no longer serves the security interests of any nation. The Cold War was the struggle of freedom against communism. Arms control is the struggle of humanity against weapons of mass destruction, most importantly nuclear weapons. The two were closely linked during the last 30 years, during the Superpower nuclear confrontation. However, the end of the Cold War has not ended the threat of weapons of mass destruction. It is up to us to continue to combat this threat in the post-Cold War world. The NPT establishes the legal and political framework in which this task must be accomplished.

Giving the NPT permanence will mark a beginning, not an end, in our efforts. The way the world views nuclear weapons for decades to come will be largely shaped by what takes place in New York this Spring. The Review and Extension Conference is an historic opportunity for the world to speak out against, and take action against, the threat of nuclear proliferation. Proliferation is essentially a political and national security problem; it demands political solutions that protect states security interests. We ask for your support and participation in making the political and legal barriers to nuclear proliferation as strong as they can possibly be, beginning with the indefinite extension of the NPT.

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#### AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY SENATOR ROTH

Amendment No. —

Calendar No. —

Purpose: To state the sense of the Senate that indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is essential for furthering the security interests of the United States and all the countries of the world.

#### IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—104TH CONG., 1ST SESS.

Referred to the Committee on H.R. 889 and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Helms and Mr. Levin)

Viz:

At the appropriate point, insert the following:

The Senate finds that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, herein after referred to as the NPT, is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime;

That, with 172 parties, the NPT enjoys the widest adherence of any arms control agreement in history;

That the NPT sets the fundamental legal and political framework for prohibiting all forms of nuclear nonproliferation;



That the NPT provides the fundamental legal and political foundation for the efforts through which the nuclear arms race was brought to an end and the world's nuclear arsenals are being reduced as quickly, safely and securely as possible;

That the NPT spells out only three extension options: indefinite extension, extension for a fixed period, or extension for fixed periods;

That any temporary or conditional extension of the NPT would require a dangerously slow and unpredictable process of re-ratification that would cripple the NPT;

That it is the policy of the President of the United States to seek indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT;

Now, therefore, it is the sense of the Senate that:

(1) indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT would strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime;

(2) indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT is in the interest of the United States because it would enhance international peace and security;

(3) the President of the United States has the full support of Congress in seeking the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT;

(4) all parties to the NPT should vote to extend the NPT unconditionally and indefinitely; and

(5) parties opposing indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT are acting against their own interest, the interest of the United States and the interest of all the peoples of the world by placing the nuclear non-proliferation regime and global security at risk.

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#### MEMORANDUM FROM CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
*March 13, 1995*

TO: Daniel Bob, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

FROM: Zachary Davis

SUBJECT: NPT vote

This memorandum responds to your request for information on the vote to decide the future of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Please call me at 7-7233 if I can be of further assistance.

According to Article X.2 of the treaty, the vote will take place 25 years after the NPT entered into force in 1970. The vote will be held during the 25-year Review and Extension Conference (RevCon) which begins April 17 at United Nations Headquarters in New York; the conference is expected to continue for about one month. The scheduling of the vote is not known at this time. Also according to the treaty, the vote will be decided by a majority of states attending the conference. With 172 states now Party to the NPT, 87 votes would constitute a majority.

Article X.2 offers three options for extending the NPT. The treaty can be extended (1) indefinitely; (2) for a fixed period; or (3) a succession of periods. The United States strongly favors indefinite extension, which would make the NPT permanent. Clinton Administration officials estimate that a majority of NPT member-states will support indefinite extension. However, some countries oppose indefinite extension; they favor a single fixed period or a succession of periods. A large number of other countries have not stated their position on NPT extension. Recent estimates of NPT votes<sup>1</sup> are as follows:

- favoring indefinite extension: 77
- opposing indefinite extension: 14
- uncommitted: 81

Four preparatory meetings have not resolved important issues regarding the voting procedure. The United States prefers that the vote be taken early in the RevCon before longstanding disputes over nuclear disarmament can jeopardize prospects for a majority endorsement of indefinite extension. It is also possible that opponents of

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<sup>1</sup>These estimates are based on unofficial and official vote counts. Vote counts vary based on interpretations of NPT member-states' public statements on NPT extension. Some estimates put the number supporting indefinite extension as low as 65. By contrast, as recent as early March, U.S. officials were estimating support for indefinite extension at around 90 votes.



indefinite extension might attempt to suspend the conference without a vote, leaving the NPT in limbo.

Another outstanding procedural issue is the manner in which the vote will be taken. There is no decision yet on which extension options should be voted on, and in what sequence they should be put to a vote. A decision on voting procedure is to be reached by consensus. A meeting is scheduled immediately prior to the RevCon to address voting procedure.

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Chairman ROTH. Thank you, Ambassador Graham.

It is now my pleasure to call upon General Goodpaster. General Goodpaster, of course, has great expertise and background as the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

Welcome, General Goodpaster.

**TESTIMONY OF GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, CO-CHAIRMAN, ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES**

General GOODPASTER. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I welcome the opportunity to present my views on this extremely important subject. It bears on matters to which I have given thought and involvement over a great many years.

I will speak from the standpoint of the security of our country and our people and the security interests to which it gives rise.

As we look to the future, we can see three great areas that will continue to challenge us to thought and action in the new security era that has begun with the end of the Cold War:

The first is U.S. security goals and efforts involving relationships with the other major nations of the world and access to resources such as oil on which we depend;

Second, the concerns of the American people regarding humanitarian and similar issues around the world where our goals and our efforts are by no means so clearly defined and definable;

And third, the whole range of nuclear issues and opportunities concerned with reducing and safeguarding against the nuclear danger.

The three areas are obviously interrelated. It is only the third, the nuclear area, that will be the subject of my remarks.

Nuclear weapons are the only thing that could destroy the United States. That was a message President Eisenhower often emphasized during the years I served with him. That was true of the other countries of the world, most of which could be destroyed by far fewer weapons than it would take to destroy us. It has remained true to this day.

The likelihood that these weapons will be used is very low, but their destructive potential is very high. We can reduce the likelihood of their use still further and can radically reduce their destructive potential. That should, in my view, be one of the highest enduring aims and efforts of our national security policy.

It is in this context that the NPT, along with its indefinite extension, takes its high importance. This treaty is unquestionably in the interest of every country that is dedicated to peace and security and even, I would say, of those countries that are not.

The NPT and its extension should be considered in conjunction with comprehensive and sustained efforts to reign in and tightly

limit the role of nuclear weapons and drastically reduce their numbers for those nations that have them, efforts and initiatives to strengthen and extend non-proliferation and counter-proliferation with respect to nations that do not now have these weapons, and the whole range of implementing associated measures to make these two primary efforts effective and carefully verified. And I welcome the emphasis that Secretary Schlesinger put on the whole process of verification.

In two Atlantic Council papers, which I would like to present to the Committee, I have set out my views on these matters at some length.

Also at the Atlantic Council, we have done a good deal of work on the whole subject of international nuclear safeguards, their promise and performance, and an analysis of the safeguards in North Korea, the case for the interim arrangements, and we will shortly be producing a paper on using the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, to verify a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The NPT and its indefinite extension, along with a comprehensive test ban, are two of the measures of highest importance of reigning in and reducing the nuclear danger. Massive reductions in nuclear arsenals can be prudently safeguarded by halting proliferation of weapons to additional countries and by a verifiable comprehensive test ban that gives assurance that nations are not secretly building a weapons capability. The massive reductions can leave everyone more secure.

The NPT, well-verified, can give assurance to nations that none of their neighbors is building a nuclear weapons capability to threaten or attack them. And the CTB can serve as a means of giving confidence to non-proliferating nations that the NPT is being observed and, to nations reducing their stockpiles, can give confidence against the dangers of breakout or technological breakthrough that would endanger the nuclear equilibrium.

It will take 10 to 12 years at a minimum, once given the necessary multilateral agreement and action to reduce world nuclear arsenals to a low level that it now seems to me be possible to contemplate and plan on—100 to 200 weapons, no more, in the hands of each nuclear weapons nation—while we study whether it might be possible ultimately to rid the world of them completely, which should be our hope.

It is necessary to give careful and sustained attention to measures to maintain our nuclear security during that time or longer under an NPT and a comprehensive test ban.

Where Article V of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a commitment by non-nuclear nations not to develop such weapons, Article VI is a commitment by nuclear weapons nations to reduce their stockpiles, looking to ultimate elimination, and Article IV is an undertaking to supply peaceful nuclear technology to non-proliferating nations.

To maintain nuclear security in those circumstances, it will be necessary to safeguard the process of reduction, as well as our necessary capabilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the comprehensive test ban, by a coordinated set of programs and actions which have been entitled "The Science-Based Stockpile

Stewardship Program” of the Department of Energy, and by the continuing nuclear activities of the Department of Defense.

The shift from test-based stockpile stewardship to science-based stewardship—that is, stewardship based on expanded and deepened scientific activity with the end of testing—carries implications of the utmost seriousness to the present and future security of our country.

I would like to draw the particular attention of this Committee to these matters.

The risks under a program of major reductions under the NPT and under a CTB would be a matter of grave concern if necessary support is not provided for the maintenance of our capabilities as the nuclear drawdown proceeds. There are too many uncertainties in the world affecting our security to think of neglecting these safeguards.

But if we tend to them in a responsible and farsighted way, an avenue to a vastly safer nuclear future lies open before us, and the indefinite extension of the NPT is an essential part of that program.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROTH. Thank you, General Goodpaster.

It is now my pleasure to call on one of the recognized experts, an individual with great experience in this area, Ambassador Adelman.

#### **TESTIMONY OF KENNETH ADELMAN, VICE PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES**

Mr. ADELMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is remarkable to think back to the first time I appeared before this Committee 12 years ago, a dozen years ago now. There were widespread doubts about the Reagan Administration and arms control and whether we would ever stop these rising levels of nuclear weapons and doomsday scenarios. There was an absolute kind of hysteria at the time. To think where we have come over the last dozen years is quite remarkable.

I applaud you, like my fellow members of the panel here, for holding this hearing. I think it is all too often that the Senate and the U.S. Government in general goes for the urgent and not for the important. This really is one of the important subjects.

And let me, if I could, Mr. Chairman, especially applaud Senator Glenn who, over the past 20 years has taken a subject that is not headline news, time and again, and has really stayed concentrated on it. He has done an outstanding job with very little reward, besides knowing he had done a very good job on something worthwhile.

And let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I have admired your work over the years, especially the way my former colleague from the Pentagon days—Jim Brady—used to work for you—and how very, very kind you were to him, especially after he was hit by a bullet meant for President Reagan. I admire you for that.

Let me just say that while I reiterate what my fellow panel members have said—that this is a matter of great urgency and great importance and that the indefinite NPT extension should be the only way we proceed—I applaud the other members of this panel

who have spent years on this subject. I was happy to hear Secretary Schlesinger mention the Baruch Plan here. I believe he was a middle-aged policy analyst at the time of the Baruch Plan, when General Goodpaster was on his way to advising future President Eisenhower.

Let me applaud all that has been done in the non-proliferation field. Certainly it is the fulfillment of Parkinson's most important law, that the success of any policy is measured by the crises that do not ensue. The NPT has been a roaring success under that criteria.

It is remarkable to think back to 1963 when President John F. Kennedy warned of a world with 15 to 20 nuclear weapons states by 1975. When he so warned, there were four nuclear weapons states; there was one more added the next year. But certainly there is nowhere near the 15 to 20 nuclear weapons states now, and we are already 20 years from when he foretold that. So it has been a remarkable success. It should be indefinitely extended for a variety of reasons that I need not repeat.

Let me, however, be most brief, because I know you want to move on to questions, and offer two slight dissents and then three policy ideas.

No. 1, slight dissents is not in the substance but in the manner of how to do it. When Secretary Schlesinger and Tom Graham—who served so well and really he is a marvelous man to head up the NPT review session—and General Goodpaster, say that verification and enforcement is quite critical, that is just wonderful rhetoric. It is just very hard to do.

I heard some of my fellow panel members mention Iraq and North Korea. We know that Iraq was a country where thousands of Westerners were running around like crazy on commercial bids. It was one of the most open countries in that part of the world—admittedly slim pickings—but it was the most open country in that part of the world. Even so with all of the concentration of the intelligence community on this, we missed a very big nuclear program that was going on.

It was only because of the Gulf War, it was only because Iraq invaded Kuwait, that we got a hold of this kind of gold mine.

Compared to North Korea, Iraq is Miami Beach. And to think that we can find in a country that puts shoe manufacturing underground—to think that we can find in that kind of country many traces of the nuclear devices and nuclear program, I think is myopic, to say the least.

That is not to say we should not try. But to say we must have good verification, we must have good enforcement, it always comes down to how.

Secretary Schlesinger says: Well, it should be either the Security Council or the member states. Then you get into the kind of options we went through last summer, I believe it was, on North Korea. Again we find slim pickings, besides going in with some kind of military might, which is very questionable in its utility, is going to create all kinds of other problems for you. Besides doing that, we find very few enforcement mechanisms.

Dissent No. 2 concerns the rhetoric I have heard all these years on non-proliferation, namely the presumption of Article VI, that the



reason other states are impatient is because the United States and the Soviet Union have not done enough—Senator Glenn mentioned this before—because of our nuclear weapons levels or because of our testing patterns, they really cannot do more.

I do not believe myself, and I never have believed, that there is really any correlation between our behavior and their proliferation. When you look at the bad guys in the world who are getting weapons or want to get weapons, you are talking about Iran; you are talking about Iraq; you are talking about North Korea and a few others. I do not think that they really pore over the number of nuclear weapons we have. I do not think they pay the least bit of attention to our testing program. I think it is all just rhetoric for the U.N. kind of conferences that Tom Graham must cope with.

What Saddam Hussein and Kim Il Soon and his son in charge of North Korea and these people in charge of Iran, are looking at is the power of their neighbors, wanting to be a main actor on the world stage, etc.

It is rhetorical that we must be good, and we must do all we can. And God knows, over the dozen years since I have come to this Committee, we have done more in the nuclear realm, in disarmament, than we ever could have imagined—imagined. Their proliferation has really nothing to do with our Governments' activities or plans.

In fact, you can make the argument, contrary to my good friend, Andy Goodpaster, that should his desire come true of a world where the United States has no nuclear weapons, that would be the greatest incentive in the world for all kinds of countries to become sudden proliferators. Why not become the only nuclear country in the world when the United States is out of the picture?

Those are my two dissents. My three ideas:

No. 1, I have to second what Senator McCain said, and I put that in my written testimony. I think it is most peculiar that the two countries in the world who are the biggest pain in the neck to good Tom Graham here on the indefinite NPT extension are Mexico and Egypt.

If there are any two countries that are living off the largess of the United States these days, it is Mexico and Egypt. And the very week when we are engineering a \$50 billion bailout with the IMF for Mexico, the very week when Egypt continues to receive \$2.1 billion a year, after receiving \$37 billion over the last 17 years in U.S. foreign aid, that they are creating this trouble for us. This shows either the lack of coordination in the Clinton Administration foreign policy or a certain timidity which I think is unwarranted.

Tom Graham says, and he is absolutely right, that the President said just last week that indefinite extension is our highest foreign policy priority.

Yet I see in *The New York Times* of March 9 that when Secretary of State Christopher goes to Cairo and the Foreign Minister, my colleague at the U.N., Musa, Anwar Musa, says that he is against indefinite extension and he wants the Israelis to do X, Y, and Z, according to the news report, Mr. Christopher talked to Mr. Musa about this and mainly, "mainly listened today" and had not pressed him to change his mind. The Foreign Minister says: "They are not pressuring us."

Now either it is a main foreign policy priority of the President, and not the Secretary of State, or it is the main priority of the Secretary of State and he does not do much about it, or—I do not know; maybe there is an explanation. I do not think that if NPT is such a priority, that we should not really go and tell Mexico and Egypt of all people: Cut it out. This is awfully important to us.

Idea No. 2 is that I do not believe that we can—and I do not believe that any member of our panel or of the Senate believes—that we can rely on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by itself, to deal with the main threat America is going to face in the coming years, which is the threat of proliferation, of weapons of mass destruction. Having First World weaponry in Third World hands is the biggest danger we face, bar none.

And I think, therefore, we should look to what I call in my testimony an “SDI, Junior,” a real defense of the country, of our friends and allies around the world. This can be quite different from the Ronald Reagan’s SDI in terms of its comprehensiveness.

President Reagan set a goal of being very comprehensive and the ability, the technological ability, to handle hordes of incoming ballistic missiles. That is no longer needed because of the breakup of the Soviet Union and disarmament from that.

I would urge the Committee and all those to accompany the NPT indefinite extension with a real focus on ballistic missile defense.

My last idea is one I have been now talking about, as Tom Graham knows, for at least 10 years. I have never understood any reason against it. And it is the idea, aside from the “SDI, Junior,” of an “INF, Senior.” This would be, quite simply, to take the treaty that Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev signed, the INF treaty which eliminated a whole band of ballistic missiles in that category, and open the treaty up, internationalize it.

The main objection to the NPT has always been: Well, the big boys have nuclear weapons and the little boys are not allowed to get them.

The INF treaty is just the opposite, so that we are not allowed to have intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and every other country out in the world is.

I see no reason myself why we should not, with Russia, have a cooperative agreement to open up in the Committee on Disarmament the INF treaty, so that everybody signs it. What this will do is preclude the advent that is coming along of some 30 to 35 countries getting ballistic missiles by the turn of the century.

Will this do it by itself? No. But as every member of this panel knows, what the non-proliferation treaty did, not by itself, but what it really encouraged was a norm to say that what had been acceptable before was no longer acceptable now.

I saw a little notice in the paper today that Israel alone is going to face 1,000 ballistic missiles before long. To think that all countries around the world are going to have this, we already have the mechanism, the INF treaty there, to preclude it. We should say: The water is fine; INF is a wonderful treaty; there is no reason why all countries should not join in.

With that, I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Adelman follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. ADELMAN

Measured by Parkinson's most astute law—that the success of any policy is known by the catastrophes which do NOT ensue—the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the jewel in the crown of arms control. That the Treaty's indefinite renewal has become more probable is a tribute to both rationality and the Clinton Administration. But, as I will explain, this necessary move is not sufficient.

*The Problem and Success*

America's top security threat for the foreseeable future comes from weapons of mass destruction spreading into irresponsible hands. Deterrence, the bulwark during the Cold War, is of little utility with an irrational, irresponsible enemy. Hence, stopping the flow of sophisticated First World weaponry to barbaric Third World leaders is an urgent goal.

So far, so good in meeting this goal. The success of the nonproliferation regime becomes dramatic when reviewing strategic studies from the 1950s, most of which foretold of a world filled with nuclear proliferators by now. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy reflected this conventional wisdom when publicly warning of a world with 15 to 20 states brandishing the bomb by 1975.

When President Kennedy spoke, there were four nuclear weapon states. The following year China made it five. Ten years later, India made it a certain six.

While a few countries have gone nuclear since then, surprisingly few have. South Africa had but lately reversed itself and again became non-nuclear. Israel and Pakistan are most probable, if not certain. Nonetheless, the total is nowhere near the 15 to 20 number President Kennedy predicted by 1975. And that date was 20 years ago now.

Nothing works by chance. What accounts for such remarkable success is the concocting of a broad and wide consensus that nuclear proliferation was a bad idea, with real consequences to the violator.

That consensus began to gel in the 1960s and gave rise to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Before then—especially in the late 1950s—Canada, West Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden showed signs of interest in building a bomb. Indeed, both the Swedish and Swiss militaries made firm decisions to go nuclear, enjoying (what now seems shockingly) wide public backing. Switzerland, for instance, held two plebiscites on making nuclear weapons. Neither time did the Swiss people vote to preclude obtaining the bomb.

Yet, before very long, the non-proliferation norm took hold and has held ever since. When France exploded the bomb in 1963, Paris received telegrams of congratulations. By the time India detonated a device in 1974, it received only telegrams of condemnation.

Nothing works by chance. U.S. officials worked hard and closely with our main allies to draw up lists of items too sensitive to export. We began to share intelligence and to apply diplomatic pressure wherever possible transgressions arose.

Fortunately, the Soviets supported such efforts and cooperated fully. They too took specific actions to preclude the bomb's spread, after co-sponsoring the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. The Reagan Administration began twice-yearly private U.S.-Soviet talks devoted solely to non-proliferation matters. Even when the Soviets walked out of all other arms control talks, in 1984, they stayed in these talks.

North Korea's actions over the past few years imperiled the non-proliferation norm, and it may do so again if the U.S.-North Korean accord falters. Iraq clearly violated both the norm and the treaty, and was punished accordingly. Pakistan violated the norm, and thus has been cut off from further U.S. foreign aid. All such steps are needed. Yet more is needed, also.

*One Dissent and Three Suggestions*

I do not believe that U.S. steps on nuclear disarmament or testing influences potential proliferators as much, or even in the manner, commonly believed. The rogue countries most worrisome—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, whomever—do not audit the number of warheads we have dismantled or tests we conduct. They care little what we do with our nuclear arsenal. Rather, they focus on their own neighborhoods and seek to have the bomb for the prestige and power it furnishes there and on the larger world stage.

Drastic reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal will probably have the opposite effect as that assumed and repeatedly stated. Rather than encourage non-proliferation—by setting a fine example and fulfilling some of the Treaty's lofty language—it might encourage proliferation by narrowing the gap between our power and theirs. Total abolition of nuclear weapons by the U.S. would, I suspect, trigger considerable proliferation.



On a more policy plane, my three suggestions build upon the administration's efforts in the diplomatic and military realms.

Diplomatically, I would encourage a tougher stance towards countries that seek to erode support for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Revealing of the administration's lack of policy coordination, or bite, is the remarkable fact that Mexico and Egypt—two nations in the world that rely most heavily upon American assistance now—are two nations who have become most vigorous in their opposition to our stance.

That we are now packaging a \$50 billion bail-out (along with the IMF) for Mexico, and continuing a \$1 billion-plus yearly aid program for Egypt (no longer essential to the peace process, and of very questionable utility in the country's development), while they vigorously oppose the administration's top foreign policy approach this spring, shows that something is terribly amiss. The fault is not theirs alone; it is ours for allowing it to continue.

Second, the indefinite extension of the Treaty and reinforcement of the non-proliferation norm will not, by itself, resolve our number one security threat—spreading weapons of mass destruction. This everyone knows.

What is needed beyond the Treaty is a credible defense against incoming ballistic missiles and a new multilateral treaty outlawing intermediate-range ballistic missiles—SDI, Jr. and INF Sr.

An SDI, Jr. would not need to protect us and our allies against a torrent of incoming Soviet missiles. This scenario, far-out during the Reagan years and flushed out to discredit SDI's effectiveness, is *passé*.

Yet the need is not *passé*. SDI (in junior form) is needed now, more than ever. Why we need to dumb-down our defensive capabilities because of the ABM Treaty, as we are now doing, is beyond me. Lawyers and the traditional arms control community have themselves been shooting down possible BMD testing with a complaint that is "Alice in Wonderland"—esque namely that THAAD or other advanced systems are just too capable.

"Some opinions are so stupid that only an intellectual could hold them," wrote George Orwell long before this instance. Imagine what Orwell would say now, with the whole logic of the ABM Treaty wrong to begin with and long outdated by now—especially since its sole other signatory, the Soviet Union, no longer exists and its successor state, Russia, now realizes the utility of having an SDI, Jr. of its own.

The feasibility of successful missile defense grows with each advancement in the scientific fields which underlay the program—guidance and sensor technology, optical systems, miniaturization of components, and systems management. And the moral attraction of missile defense remains as strong and evident as when it lured Ronald Reagan. Should North Korea transgress, rather than our attacking its nuclear facility—a military exercise of huge risk and low probability of ending that nuclear program—the U.S., Japan, South Korea and other high-tech countries would have greater protection from missiles.

Third, the administration should propose an initiative which is both beneficial and do-able, namely a world-wide ban on most threatening ballistic missiles, an INF, Sr.

Without such a step, by the turn of the century some 25 developing nations will have ballistic missiles, most of which those countries will have the scientific skills to make their own, and half of them either have or are near to getting nuclear capability, as well. Thirty countries will have chemical weapons and ten will be able to deploy biological weapons.

One helpful move would be surprisingly simple, able to be put in four words: Internationalize the INF Treaty. Hence the treaty which Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev signed in December 1987 would be opened to all countries around the world. The current American and Russian ban on all land-based ballistic missiles with ranges between 300 and 2,400 miles-would apply to any and all signatory nations.

Why should India or Syria or Libya or Iraq legally be able to test and possess such a ballistic missile, while the United States and Russia are not? In the 40-member Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the U.S. and Russia could cooperate on stopping missile proliferation just as we cooperate on stopping nuclear proliferation.

Would countries sign on? Arab nations might welcome the eradication of SCUD-like missiles, especially after the Gulf War horror of having them threaten Saudi Arabia nightly. As would most Israelis, due to their sleepless, SCUD-scary nights. In exchange for eliminating such a ghastly threat from Syria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, and others forevermore, the Israelis may well grab the initiative with both hands.

Among countries close to us, only France would have to cut up such missiles. But France has only a handful of this type missiles and keeps pushing its nuclear force out to sea. And even if the French were to complain and resist, what else is new?



They and the Chinese, who would probably refuse as well, stalled on joining the NPT for decades but recently came around and signed.

Hence, even if INF, Sr. failed to enlist all the world's states, as it would fail, it would still prove worthwhile. For such a move would begin to form a non-proliferation norm on ballistic missiles, just as it has on nuclear weapons. INFO Sr. would help make procuring or producing ballistic missiles wicked rather than wonderful. It would raise moral objections to such a pursuit, which is now morally permissible if not laudable.

A world-wide INF scheme could be easily verified. For included would be a ban on missile flight tests, which are easily detectable to outsiders and restrictive to potential violators. And such a INF treaty would play into arms control's main strength; it would help in regions where neither side possesses such a weapon and each would rather not acquire it than end up with both obtaining it.

This suggestion, along with the two others offered here, would extend and reinforce the non-proliferation norms would have served us beyond our expectations. They would help clarify rights and wrongs in our newly murky world, which is a positive benefit in itself. It brings to mind that great scene in the movie, "Three Days of the Condor."

"You saw some action once, too, didn't you?" a young CIA analyst asked an intelligence veteran. "Do you miss the action?"

The experienced hand answered slowly and carefully, "It's not the action I miss. It's the clarity."

Chairman ROTH. Well, thank you, Ambassador Adelman. I share your concern on this latter point, and it is one that we would like to discuss further with you.

Ambassador Graham, on several occasions now, the question of certain countries not cooperating in an indefinite extension of the treaty has come up. And I have to say it is a matter of real concern and disbelief to me to look at the case of Mexico, to look at the case of Egypt, and wondering why we are not getting support from them.

Even more mystifying, of course, is the question of why the administration is not imposing greater effort to persuade them to join us. It is pretty hard, to me, to see Congress voting for foreign aid for Egypt or to help bail out Mexico when they lead the opposition to what we all here agree is the most critically important international agreement to come up in this year.

My question to you, Ambassador, is: What is going to be done about this? You, yourself, have said—and I think most of the parties here would agree—that it is not only getting the indefinite extension agreed to by a simple majority, but the number becomes important because it shows the broad consensus that there is on this globe for this treaty.

Why is the administration not taking tougher action to get these people onboard, these countries onboard?

Ambassador GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, that is a very fair question. And as Secretary Schlesinger said during his opening remarks, he looked forward to my discussion of some of the disagreements that we have had with some of the countries around the world.

The two cases that you mention, Egypt and Mexico, are both similar and different. Egypt, in the past, has been a very strong supporter of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, of course, they—it is undeniable; they have been a close ally of the United States and a recipient of a considerable amount of foreign aid.

They are concerned, as they put it, about the future and in particular what their neighbor, Israel, is going to do about the program, the nuclear program, that exists there. They say that: We have no problem with the current Government of Israel; they are

doing all the right things. But they have a significant capability right nextdoor to us, and that is something for the future it is difficult for us to ignore. What guarantee do we have that 20 years from now there could be an unstable regime in that country?

So they have taken a position that they will not support the indefinite extension or even a long extension of the NPT unless Israel, to use their words, takes a, quote, "concrete step," close quote, in the direction of eventually joining NPT prior to the conference.

Of course, as you are well aware, the Israelis have a very good argument on their side, because the peace process does not include Iraq and Iran, and they have to be careful about what they agree to and what they commit to.

So it is a difficult problem. I have been to Egypt twice myself and talked to Ken Adelman's Foreign Minister Musa, and I have also been to Israel. The two, Israel and Egypt, have engaged in rather extensive discussions between the two of them, and ultimately if this is going to be resolved, I think it has to be settled between the two of them.

They have engaged in very extensive consultations. Prime Minister Rabin, Foreign Minister Perez, have made trips to Cairo. Foreign Minister Musa has been to Israel. They have met in other countries.

I think there is some possibility they will work out something between the two of them that will leave both of them comfortable and that will permit Egypt to support indefinite extension. It is no sure thing. It may not work. But there is considerable effort going into this from both sides. And as I said, many of us have been involved in trying, to the extent we can, to help reach a solution.

We very much hope that Egypt in the end will come around. The NPT is important to their security, as well as ours and the security of many other countries. And they have long been an ally of ours, and we hope—as I say, it is no sure thing—but we hope in the end they will come around.

Mexico is somewhat of a different case. They do not have any concern in terms of a nearby nuclear weapons potential program. They are a member of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, which has made Latin America a nuclear-free area.

I have considerable difficulty in understanding the Mexican position, and I cannot give a good explanation for it. They claim, the Mexican officials claim, that they want to put pressure, want to keep pressure on the nuclear weapons states to pursue nuclear disarmament, and therefore they are hesitant to embrace an indefinite extension of the NPT.

And when they say this, they mention as their primary interest a comprehensive test ban treaty, yet this is under active negotiation in Geneva, and there is an ongoing nuclear test moratorium.

It seems to me that if one takes their stated concerns, that we have met them. So their position is difficult for me to understand.

We have made it very clear to them that we believe that less than indefinite extension will introduce uncertainty about the future of the NPT and the broader non-proliferation regime and that this is not the kind of environment that is conducive to continued arms control progress.

We have made it very clear to both Egypt and Mexico how important this issue is to the United States, how the United States feels that it is directly threatened by non-proliferation. After all, we had a bomb in The World Trade Center. Who is to say that the next device placed by some group in the future might not be a nuclear device? This is fundamental to our national security. We have made that very clear to both countries.

I have also been to Mexico twice, as have many other U.S. officials. So the message has been transmitted to Mexico very clearly.

Chairman ROTH. You go back to the statement of Ambassador Adelman where I think it was in the case of Egypt, they said no great pressure was put upon them to support indefinite extension.

I just find that incomprehensible. And it seems to me that for a treaty where we all agree as to its importance and the importance that there be an indefinite extension, that this should be—the negotiation, the pressure, or whatever should be at the highest level.

I find it shocking, because this country has been a good friend for years to Egypt, continues to be. The same is true of Mexico. And I just cannot find any logical reason for their not working with us.

Secretary Schlesinger.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to endorse some of the comments of Ambassador Adelman. I think that this has not been well-coordinated by the U.S. Government. I refer to this very delicately in my statement as “I am happy to see that the U.S. Government is *now* focusing at the highest levels on this issue.”

We have failed to convey to others *early on*—before those preliminary conferences—the importance of NPT extension to the United States. If you talk to foreign officials, they will say: We know where Tom Graham stands; we know where ACPA stands; but what we want to know is where the President of the United States stands. And until the statement of early March by the President, it was not clear that he strongly felt that this was a high priority.

The case of Egypt is quite distinct from Mexico. The Egyptians have a genuine problem in the neighborhood, as they see it, and they also have a problem with their own public opinion.

So one can understand, even sympathize, with their problem. What we failed to do was to convey *early on* that although we understood that they had a problem with indefinite extension, we did not want to see Egypt being a ringleader in the Middle East to round up votes to oppose indefinite extension.

Chairman ROTH. Exactly.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. If they voted against it, we could understand that. So the Egyptians really do have a problem.

In the case of Mexico, it is a case of some of those diplomats who have been playing games in disarmament conferences for, lo, these last 30 years. There is no justification for the Mexican position, other than a continuation of a long trend of just tweaking the Eagle's feathers in the diplomatic arena because of problems outside of the diplomatic arena.

Chairman ROTH. Well, you make a very important point, Mr. Secretary.

One of the things again that disturbs me is, we are not only talking about these two countries, but, as I understand it, what these

countries do could have a very significant impact on what other countries in the region do.

Now we have had testimony from all of you, I believe, as to how important it is not only that the legislation or the treaty be extended, but the size of the majority. And that is what I find incomprehensible here.

We all agree. There is no partisan fight. We all know the treaty is important. We think it should be extended indefinitely. We think it should be extended by as large a majority as possible.

And for that reason, I agree with what you say, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Adelman, that it is hard to understand why the administration waited so long, and at this stage it seems to be critically important that the leaders of these other countries know where this country stands from the top down.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. It was only last week, Mr. Chairman, that Haiti agreed to come along and support indefinite extension.

We remember Haiti. We just reinstalled the President of Haiti. I am not sure that General Cedras would have given us equal difficulty on this issue.

Chairman ROTH. Well, I understand when it was first raised, they said: What agreement is that?

Well, my time is up, but—

Mr. ADELMAN. But it is not just—if I may say—it is not just the timing that Secretary Schlesinger is right about. When the Secretary of State sits there just last Thursday, less than a week ago, and the Foreign Minister of Egypt says: He is not pressuring us; he is not pressuring us on the issue at all; you just wonder. Maybe NPT is a priority of Tom Graham, and God bless him and Members of this Committee, but it certainly is not the Secretary of State's priority.

Chairman ROTH. Well, one of the things that bothers me is that I know now that there seems to be some confidence that we have the necessary votes. But I have to tell you, it was not too long ago—and I am not that positive even today—that those votes are locked up. I have seen on this Senate floor where people thought they had a majority, and it does not always develop.

Mr. ADELMAN. I have seen on confirmation votes the same thing. [Laughter.]

Chairman ROTH. To be very honest, it makes me very nervous that in—what is it—a month's time, the Ambassador who leads our delegation is going to be faced with this picture, and there is no certainty, as far as I can tell, that we do have a firm majority. I hope he is right. Are you right?

Ambassador GRAHAM. I believe that we will have a significant majority for indefinite extension. That is my judgment. But we will find out at the conference.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I do not think you are reassuring the Chairman. [Laughter.]

Chairman ROTH. No. Unfortunately that is what gives me concern. And I cannot stress too much the importance of a whip check to make sure that we have got firm votes.

Mr. ADELMAN. But is it not just the numbers as well. I mean, Palau is wonderful, and I wish Gabon would join and all that. But the fact is that Egypt is a critical country in a critical area of the



world. And if you have that, one-half of the Arab people, saying: We do not want to that; that carries a lot more weight than Palau.

Chairman ROTH. Absolutely. Well, my time is up for the first round.

Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Well, just to follow up on this a little bit, and we have been on this quite a while, but we are talking about Egypt and Mexico.

How about the other nations? How about the rest of them who will not give a commitment or you do not have in your vest pocket? Are there other reasons they are giving? In other words, is Dr. Schlesinger's concern, as he said, about undue accommodation or unreasonable concessions, are people wanting a quid pro quo before they will give us their vote?

That is not unheard of on the Senate floor, either, I might add. [Laughter.]

Ambassador GRAHAM. No, that is not unheard of anywhere.

It has not been so much of a quid pro quo, except, of course, these disarmament items that have been in public circulation for some time. And, of course, many countries that I have spoken with say they would like to have more peaceful nuclear cooperation. But it has not so much been a quid pro quo; it has been more an exercise in persuasion and stressing how important this is to the United States, how important we think this is to the security of the world.

We have made a Government-wide effort in every country of the world to bring in this vote. I have been working in arms control for 25 years, and I have never seen the degree of commitment that now exists and the degree of unanimity and unity of purpose that now exists in the Executive Branch to achieve this objective.

We have conducted many demarches. Well, we have conducted demarches in every country several times in pursuing this effort. I, myself, have traveled to over 30 countries to talk to their leadership to try to persuade them of the desirability of making the NPT permanent.

The trend is definitely up. I do believe we will have the votes. And certainly we want the largest majority possible.

Chairman ROTH. Well, I think the stick, rather than the carrot approach which Dr. Schlesinger sort of endorsed—I think it is about time to do that before we get up there and do not have the votes for this thing.

General Goodpaster, you suggest taking our nuclear weapons down to 100 or 200. That seems pretty low to me.

And another area I would appreciate your comments on, I have always been an advocate of—I am not such a hawk that I want to see us maintain our 2.1 million active duty force or anything. I think it was right to cut back some.

But I begin to be a little leery of how low we are cutting in what we are doing right now. We are down to about 1.45 million. And if you look at us, our ability to even do another Persian Gulf, if it extended out over a period of time where you had to keep about a third of your forces out and another third to replace them and a third in the Pentagon and flying the runways at Omaha or what-

ever, we begin to border on not being able to even do another Persian Gulf right now.

And I have always looked at that as sort of the really important factor in never reaching a nuclear threshold or where people think they could use nuclear weapons with impunity because we were too weak to do anything about it.

Your 100 to 200, with all the worldwide commitments, with what might happen with a reconstituted Soviet Union, if that ever occurred or whatever, it seems to me to be pretty low.

What do you base that on?

General GOODPASTER. What I have in mind is a two-phase process. I think that we and Russia now can go down to some level between 1,000 and 2,000, and we go down together. At that point, before that, we should have been working multilaterally with Britain, China, and France to see if we can obtain that agreement among the five declared nuclear states to go down to a much lower level—100 to 200 as I mentioned earlier.

In the work that I have done on this—and it has been pretty extensive—I cannot find any level until you get down to about that level that could not be prudently safeguarded.

It will take, as I mentioned, 10 to 12 years to get down to that level. During that time, if the world situation turns dark, if we should see a reversion to a security policy of confrontation rather than cooperation, it will always be possible to stop the reduction, providing we have maintained—continue to maintain the capability in terms of our nuclear establishment.

At the present time, I do not think anybody knows how to eliminate nuclear weapons completely. But I would hope that by the time we get down to a level of 100 to 200, that is 100 to 200 Nagasakis or Hiroshimas, and that is a very powerful—that still is a very powerful military force.

By the time we get down to that level during the 10 to 12 years of reduction, a lot of thinking should go into this. We will learn the extent to which we can be confident of our verification measures.

I, myself, associate that with the non-proliferation, which I describe as a process of detection, dissuasion, deterrence. But if all of these fail and a country does indeed develop these weapons and threatens to use them, we should be able to defeat and destroy that. And we could do that with the 100 to 200 weapons that we are talking about here.

With regard to the other part of your comment, I would say that I endorse very, very strongly the reliance on the conventional side of our armed forces. My colleague, Paul Nitze, has the view that we can do everything that we really need or want to do—other than providing the use of nuclear weapons against us—we can do that with conventional arms, and we should have the conventional arms that make it very clear to others that we have that capability.

But with regard to the 100 to 200, I think that is a useful goal to have. I think it is in our interest to have such a goal, and I believe that when other nations understand that that is, in fact, our goal, and when they understand that the role of nuclear weapons for us—and, I think, for the other declared powers—is simply to prevent their use by others, that they have no further significance,

that they should understand and support the need for the non-proliferation treaty as part of that overall program.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, thank you.

Dr. Schlesinger, we sort of have a bargain within the NPT. We say the bargain is that you will not develop weapons, and we will cooperate and all that sort of thing, and it gives the non-weapon states, parties to the treaty, access to peaceful nuclear technologies in return for their non-proliferation commitment.

That has caused some difficulties over the years. Currently, as an example, Iran is complaining because we are seeking to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear reactor from Russia.

Now do they have a legitimate beef, a legitimate complaint, because they supposedly are operating strictly within the treaty itself, yet we think they—for other reasons, we think they may have some other motives in mind? What would you do in that case?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, this tension between the civilian use and the nuclear use goes back at least to General Eisenhower's 1954 address on Atoms for Peace that General Goodpaster may well recall. In fact, he may actually have written it, for all I know.

There is a bargain there, and it is reflected in the charter of the IAEA that the less developed countries look for technical assistance in this area as their price for adhering to these agreements.

In the case of Iran, there is a problem of credibility, because the United States, which is objecting to Russia's finishing a reactor started by the Germans under the Shah, is at the same time proposing to put 6,000 thermal megawatts of electric capacity in Korea as a way of heading off nuclear spread. The Russians can say that they are merely emulating the United States, that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery and the like.

Should we distrust the Iranians? Based upon what we know about their intentions, we can say that they have goals other than to provide a civilian nuclear program. And based upon that other information, we are quite right to be concerned about the Iranians. They are not fulfilling the commitment in the Atoms for Peace program or for the NPT of avoiding seeking a military capability, and therefore they do not come to us with clean hands.

Senator GLENN. Should we be pushing toward some sort of international control of plutonium and fissile material? We have Japan sitting out there right now. We signed a 30-year agreement with Japan, no strings attached, go ahead and reprocess things, get the plutonium out.

It seems to me that if we are ever going to get final control of this, it gets final because you make some international repository, and it is internationally monitored for plutonium and so on, maybe even our own sometime in the future.

That would go beyond the General's comments of keeping the 100 to 200. Maybe that is our objective sometime for the future.

My time is up, so if you could make a just brief comment on that, I would appreciate it.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think that we should be pushing in the direction of international controls on plutonium that comes out of civilian programs. Once again—

Senator GLENN. How about military, too, though?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, we should certainly explore that as well. But the biggest problem that we are going to have in the years ahead will be the plutonium that comes out of electric power reactors.

And I think that we can find some agreement on that plutonium that will be backed up by our allies. The biggest problem that we have in this area is that our allies have been suspicious of the United States' motives on these questions because of the continued argument between us and EURATOM and Japan and ourselves on reprocessing. They suspect the U.S. Government.

I think that we can reach an accommodation if they believe that we are not attempting to head them off on the reprocessing issue.

Chairman ROTH. Senator Levin?

#### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our panel.

I took a trip a couple years ago and was struck by the desire of just about every country I visited to have reliance on nuclear weapons or at least for some capability.

We went to China and talked nuclear weapons, and they said: Well, gee, they have got Russia nextdoor; they surely are not going to give up nuclear weapons.

We went to India, and they said: Gee, we have been at war with China; China has got them; you want us to sign NPT?

We went to Pakistan and gave them the lecture, and they said: Well, wait a minute, India has the capability or probably does; you want us to be naked?

And you go the Middle East, it is basically the same argument.

So I think that our own lectures to people about nuclear weapons are going to fall on somewhat deaf ears unless we take actions to reduce our own reliance on nuclear weapons.

As long as we are moving in that direction of lesser and lesser nuclear weapons, it seems to me that we have got at least some standing to argue to other countries that they ought to be joining a comprehensive test ban or they ought to be signing an NPT or they ought to whatever it is that we want them to do, so that we can try to get to the proliferation problem.

So our effort to reduce proliferation in this world, I believe to a significant extent is dependent upon our own actions in the area of nuclear weapons. To the extent that we are taking actions inconsistent with what we are asking others to do, it seems to me we have undermined our own position to some extent, at least, in terms of arguing for non-proliferation, be it the treaty or in a number of other ways.

I would like to raise the question first of the ABM treaty with you, Ambassador Graham. It sounds like it is a billiards shot away, but it really is not.

The argument that we are now facing, if we should adopt a Senate unilateral definition of what is allowed under the ABM treaty, may determine whether or not Russia will not ratify START II and, in fact, may pull out of START I. If that happens, then we have got a situation where we would no longer be moving to lesser numbers, but would be halted in that regard.



Do you see a relationship between our behavior towards the ABM treaty and our position on NPT?

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, Senator Levin, this is not an issue that comes up very often in the NPT extension process. In fact, to the best of my recollection, it has only come up once, and that was with the Chinese in Beijing last October, and they said they were very supportive of the viability of the ABM treaty.

However, the reductions under START I and START II are very relevant to the extension of the NPT and all of the issues that surround it. It is very important that those reductions go forward. And if an eliminated or substantially weakened ABM treaty should cause those reductions to slow down or stop, that would have a negative—certainly quite a negative effect on NPT extension.

Mr. ADELMAN. Senator, if I may?

Senator LEVIN. Sure.

Mr. ADELMAN. Are you through, Tom?

Just to make some comments, when Senator Levin, who I know has taken a great interest in these arms control issues over the years and has really added a great deal to the discussion—when you, Senator Levin, gave your quick trip report, I was struck by the fact that you said each of these countries had problems on nuclear weapons. Basically the way you reported it was because of their neighbors.

It seems to me, as I put in my testimony, that one of the great myths in this whole non-proliferation field has been that non-proliferation of others depends on what we do.

When you look at the bad guys, as I said in the statement and before you entered, you look at the bad guys—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, whomever their foreign policy has very little to do with the U.S. nuclear totals or testing. It has everything in the world to do with them wanting prestige, them wanting X, Y, and Z.

That's what you reported from your trip to Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. Pakistan does not care what we do on testing. India does not either. But they care about what each other do.

On the ABM treaty—

Senator LEVIN. But does Russia—does Russia care what we do on ABM?

Mr. ADELMAN. Oh, I think that is a whole new field.

Senator LEVIN. And does China care what Russia does?

Mr. ADELMAN. Yes. And there is a billiard—

Senator LEVIN. And does India care what China does?

Mr. ADELMAN. There is a billiard effect. Now I have raised the ABM treaty because I think it is very serious. We needed a ballistic missile program. You and I, Senator, have talked about this now for the last 10 years.

On the ABM treaty, I think that Russians—rather than continue “old think” that we needed an ABM treaty to have the reductions continue something that I think was always questionable from the start—may no longer believe that.

But without a Soviet Union, now with Russia's threats from its own neighbors, they realize the problem of ballistic missiles facing them. I think that the Russians would be quite interested in a ballistic missile defense. If it were up to me, I would say that the ABM treaty is a treaty that should be given a golden watch and

a great handshake and told it has done a wonderful job for a number of years, but that its time has passed.

Senator LEVIN. Just pull out of it?

Mr. ADELMAN. Just pull out.

Senator LEVIN. Well, that is straightforward enough, anyway.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, could I add one thing to this?

Senator LEVIN. It is wrong, but it is straightforward.

Mr. ADELMAN. OK.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator Levin has pointed to the reaction of neighbors. Indeed, acquisition of nuclear weapons is infectious. However, you must look at other than the neighbors. If you look at all of the nations of NATO, and most prominently Germany, if you look at Japan, they would have acquired nuclear weapons; Korea would have acquired nuclear weapons, if they had not had strong faith in the adequacy of the large American deterrent, and without that deterrent, one will stimulate growth not merely amongst neighbors, but amongst larger powers.

Senator LEVIN. Are you suggesting that Germany and Japan do not want us to reduce the number of nuclear weapons?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I do not think that they want us to go down towards the very low levels, for example, that General Goodpaster would have suggested.

Senator LEVIN. Well, I am not raising that level. Are you saying—are you suggesting, though, that they would not—

Mr. SCHLESINGER. They are happy to see us go down to 3,500 under the START II agreement.

Senator LEVIN. And are you suggesting that they would not like us to go below that?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I suspect that you would have strong reservations expressed, particularly by the Germans, under those circumstances.

Senator GLENN. Senator Levin, could I just add one brief comment—

Senator LEVIN. Sure.

Senator GLENN [continuing]. On what Ken Adelman said?

It is the position of this administration that the ABM treaty is part of the fabric of arms control agreements that interrelate one to another, and it is important to preserve it, and this administration does strongly support the viability of the ABM treaty.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Adelman, if our withdrawing from the ABM treaty resulted in NPT not being renewed, would that have any impact on your judgment about ABM?

Mr. ADELMAN. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Would you change your judgment in that case?

Mr. ADELMAN. It would have an impact on my judgment. I would think it would be a bad idea.

Senator LEVIN. To withdraw from ABM under those circumstances.

Mr. ADELMAN. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. But you do not think that the withdrawal from ABM would have any effect on NPT, even though it meant the end of START I and START II.

Mr. ADELMAN. See, I do not believe that for a moment. That is farfetched in my mind. I think that the Russians have every incen-

tive in the world to reduce their nuclear weapons. In fact, I think one of the things that the Senate has done that has been magnificent is the Nunn-Lugar legislation, and I think that the Pentagon has been, through the Bush and the Clinton Administrations, all too slow and inept at dismantlement of Russian and Ukrainian missiles. They are dying to do more.

Senator LEVIN. If I can just get back to my question. You are saying basically that the Russians are not telling us the truth when they say that this would jeopardize their compliance with START I and the ratification of START II, if we unilaterally defined the ABM treaty? You just do not believe it?

Mr. ADELMAN. I do not believe it, number one, and number two, when the Russian Ambassador Vorontsov, my counterpart and a very good man, says in town, as he did last week: Well, if the U.S. goes ahead on ballistic missiles and tinkers with the ABM treaty, we are going to have to have the resources to go ahead with ballistic missile defense. You know what I say to him? God bless them. Let us work together on this. This is something that Ronald Reagan—in a crazy idea, what I thought was a totally crazy idea in 1984—has come around to be a very good idea. I would cooperate fully with the Russians on ballistic missile defense.

Senator LEVIN. You say God bless them when it comes to what they say they would have to do in terms of defense, but you say you do not believe them when they say that they would not—

Mr. ADELMAN. Stop the reductions on the START I and the START II? No, I do not believe them at all.

Senator LEVIN. Thanks.

Chairman ROTH. Senator Cochran.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, let me ask Ambassador Graham about his reaction to some criticisms I have heard recently of the IAEA and the fact that it is not doing all it can do or should do under the treaty to help ensure that nation states do not divert nuclear materials for weapons production.

Is there a serious concern in your mind or is there a basis for concern in your mind that together with a permanent extension of INF—I mean, of the NPT—that we need to consider strengthening the hand of IAEA or adopting different procedures from the ones that are used now to judge whether safeguards are being obeyed and whether or not the safeguards are sufficient to do what we would like to see done under the non-proliferation agreement?

Ambassador GRAHAM. Senator Cochran, I think we do need to do more, and more is being done right now. It has been recognized for several years now that the capability of the IAEA to monitor and detect violations of the NPT needs to be strengthened.

Ken Adelman mentioned earlier how difficult all of this is, and it certainly is difficult. But we can do more, and we should do more.

Earlier I mentioned the 93-plus-2 program, which is something ongoing at the IAEA to develop new techniques and new technologies to monitor compliance with the NPT. That is something that has already resulted in some improvements and will result, we believe, in more improvements in the future. And the United



States, it is very much in our interest to support that, and we intend to support that.

Undoubtedly at the Extension Conference itself, there will be a lengthy discussion of this subject. And just as in 1990 at the Review Conference of the NPT that year, which was reviewing the operation of the NPT, some new initiatives for IAEA in improving its ability to get the job done emerged. I suspect more will emerge from the Extension Conference beginning next month.

It is a very important subject, and we need to do everything we can.

Senator COCHRAN. I even heard one expert in the foreign policy area say that the IAEA was contributing to nuclear proliferation. Is that a fair criticism?

Ambassador GRAHAM. I do not think that is a fair criticism. It is part of their mission to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology, but I certainly do not think that they are contributing to proliferation of weapons.

Senator COCHRAN. Secretary Schlesinger.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the criticism of the powers of the IAEA is well taken, not the criticism of the IAEA itself. The IAEA has fulfilled its responsibilities. It is the IAEA's responsibility to point out when a nation is not in compliance. They have done so. It then goes to the Security Council, which has been, to say the least, hesitant, if not timid, with regard to what occurs subsequently.

We should be strengthening the IAEA indeed, but we have been equivocal in our support. When they demanded challenge inspections in North Korea, the United States said: Well, do not press them too hard. We had pushed the IAEA forward, and then sawed off that limb.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Adelman, do you have any comments?

Mr. ADELMAN. No.

Senator COCHRAN. Or General Goodpaster on that subject?

General GOODPASTER. No.

Senator COCHRAN. In pushing toward ratification, I guess we would have to ratify this here in the Senate. I know we will be asked questions, those of us who support the indefinite extension of this agreement. We will be asked questions about whether this is just a piece of paper, and it does not really do what it is advertised to do, and that is something effective about stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Ambassador GRAHAM. Well, the NPT itself is the basic instrument we have to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and all of the other arms control treaties, international arms control treaties and international arrangements, to control the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction have a permanent status. They are permanent treaties.

Only the NPT, which is the grandfather and the cornerstone of all of these other efforts, has this uncertain future, which must be resolved, we believe, this spring in favor of making the NPT a permanent part of the international security system.

But this a decision that when the Senate ratified NPT on a one-time and one-time-only basis that was delegated to the participants at the conference itself. So the conference is legally empowered to



make this decision as to the further extension of the NPT, but only on a one-time basis.

That is why this conference is so important. We can extend the NPT indefinitely at this conference, and it does not have to go back to 173 legislatures, which would take 35 years to approve, if it ever got approved. It can be made at the conference, and the decision is by majority vote.

But any further extensions—say, if the conference decided to extend the treaty for only 10 years—any further extension beyond that would be an amendment to the treaty. It would have to go to 173 legislatures. And that probably makes it an impossibility when you consider all of the legislatures that would be involved and also the fact that it took 19 years in a more benign environment for the original signatories to the NPT to complete their ratifications.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, whatever the problems of preventing proliferation with the treaty, with the NPT, they would be vastly greater without the NPT. It is the NPT that we have used in both the cases of Iraq and North Korea, catching them in violations.

Senator COCHRAN. Well, thank you very much. I have had a chance to read all of your statements while I have been here, and I find them very interesting and helpful to us as we consider this very important issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROTH. Thank you, Senator Cochran.

It is my hope that in the next several days either to offer an amendment in support of indefinite extension on the part of the Senate, or perhaps freestanding, depending on the leadership.

But I cannot stress too much how important many of us here in the Senate believe this treaty is. And we do hope—we know you have your work cut out for you, and we wish you very well, but we think it is critically important that it be clear to all countries, the importance that is attached to this extension by this country, both in the Executive Branch as well as the Congress.

And I just want to express my appreciation to each of you for being here today and adding so much to our understanding and learning of this most important issue.

Ambassador Graham?

Ambassador GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank you for this hearing and also thank you for your support, for a resolution of support behind our efforts to achieve indefinite extension.

And if I could just make one last brief comment on the numbers and the countries involved, I sincerely do believe that we will have a majority on indefinite extension at this conference, and I believe it will be a significant majority.

The principal problems we face are, on the one hand, the problems that we discussed with Egypt and Mexico earlier.

But also there are many countries of the world for whom proliferation is not a high priority, and many of them are members of the non-aligned movement, headed by Indonesia, and some of them are—or many of them are—being pressured by the non-aligned movement not to support indefinite extension wherein many cases they want to. They want to be helpful to the United States.

So it is that tug-of-war that we have to deal with, persuading these countries to support us and to resist the pressures from the non-aligned movement not to.

Chairman ROTH. Well, we wish you well, and we wish you a splendid majority.

Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being here.

The Committee is in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the Committee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]



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